From AI with Love: Reading Big Data Poetry through Gilbert Simondon’s Theory of
Transduction
Computation initiated a far-reaching re-imagination of language, not just as an information tool,
but as a social, bio-physical activity in general. Modern lexicology provides an important
overview of the ongoing development of textual documentation and its applications in relation to
language and linguistics. At the same time, the evolution of lexical tools from the first
dictionaries and graphs to algorithmically generated scatter plots of live online interaction
patterns has been surprisingly swift. Modern communication and information studies from
Norbert Weiner to the present-day support direct parallels between coding and linguistic
systems. However, most theories of computation as a model of language use remain highly
indefinite and open-ended, at times purposefully ambiguous. Comparing the use of computation
and semantic technologies ranging from Christopher Strachey’s early love letter templates to
David Jhave Johnson’s more recent experiments with artificial neural networks (ANNs), this
paper proposes the philosopher Gilbert Simondon’s theory of transduction and metastable
systems as a suitable framework for understanding various ontological and epistemological
ramifications in our increasingly complex and intimate interactions with machine learning. Such
developments are especially clear, I argue, in the poetic reimagining of language as a space of
cybernetic hybridity.
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From AI with Love: Reading Big Data Poetry through Gilbert Simondon’s Theory of
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Few critics consider the well-known “Love Letters” Christopher Strachey generated and
printed with the Manchester University Computer in 1952 to mark much of a literary or even
salutatory achievement. Nevertheless, the simple print outs Strachey distributed to his
colleagues’ letter boxes one spring morning that year confirm the importance of computer
programming as a linguistic accomplishment as much as a triumph in automated calculation.
Strachey’s template-based application, the “M.U.C. Love Letter Generator,” was certainly novel
for its time, especially since the program’s host machine, the newly implemented Manchester
Ferranti or simply the U.C., was one of the first commercially available computers in the world.
Its model type was an upgrade of Manchester’s very own Mark 1, A UK version of the original
IBM machine, the Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator (ASCC) developed at Harvard
during the mid-1940s for the Manhattan Project. John von Neumann helped bring the model to
Manchester when he returned there from Boston in June of 1948. Strachey joined the lab at the
invite of the M.U.C. Lab’s assistant director, Alan Turing, just four years later and almost
immediately set upon compiling his letter generating apparatus while waiting for his first
assignments.
Turing remains, of course, something of a founding figure in the cultural history of digital
communication, especially in relation to artificial intelligence. He had determined even before
Strachey joined the lab many key issues that continue to drive science and industry’s ongoing
interweaving of computation, programming, and linguistic study. Techniques for
computationally mimicking human conversation are still evaluated for authenticity via his selftitled “Turing Test.” Strachey’s M.U.C. “Love Letters” would have certainly failed Turing’s test,

yet they still constitute an inaugural moment in the development of natural language process
(NLP) tools by applying recombinatory patterns in linguistics to mimic the form and format of a
generic love letter.
As this paper argues, computation initiated a far-reaching re-envisioning of language as
an information-based, knowledge tool in relation to bio-physical activity in general. Modern
lexicology provides an important overview of the ongoing development of textual and
diagrammatic formats and their myriad applications in relation to linguistic communication. Yet
the evolution of lexical tools from the first dictionaries and graphs to today’s algorithmically
generated scatter plots of live interaction patterns across the web has been surprisingly swift.
With these advances, increasingly distinct models of linguistic processing have become equally
applicable to bio-physical cognition as to any information technology. The very concept of a
“thinking machine,” as Turing laid out as early as 1950 in his well-known essay for Mind,
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” did not so much elevate programming to levels of
human intelligence, as it reconsidered the latter to be at a fundamental level a mode of
computation (1950).
Close to Turing’s time with the Manchester Mark 1, mathematician Norbert Weiner also
considered computability to be very much inseparable from broader epistemological searches for
what he called a universal symbolic language, where reasoning and decision making could be
augmented by textual configurations based in logical systems. For Weiner, determining a method
for such mechanisms would be a core focus of the then-nascent discourse of cybernetics with its
corresponding study of self-regulating or “servo” systems (1948). Andy Clark a half century later
similarly emphasized the cyborg as a powerful model for understanding the increasingly intricate
connections humans tend to forge with their technical environments. In his influential analysis of

cognition and computation, Natural Born Cyborgs (2003), he declares “the cyborg” to be “a
potent cultural icon of the late twentieth century. … For what is special about human brains, and
what best explains the distinctive features of human intelligence, is precisely their ability to enter
deep and complex relationships with non-biological constructs, props, and aids” (loc. 51). To
look at texts as cybernetic apparatuses where, as we see in coding, language’s symbolic use to
arrange and program tasks logically is prioritized over its semantic function is not to displace one
linguistic form by the other. Language’s programming capacity should not be somehow gauged
as its culminating cognitive role, implicitly re-assessing verbal semantics as a flawed mode of
reasoning; yet neither can these functions be accurately isolated from each other. John Cayley
makes a similar point just prior to Clark’s popular study. For Cayley what’s significant in a
cybernetic sense of language is the emphatic interactivity between the two applications: “both
code and language are practices of the symbolic,” he notes, while at the same time “code shares
language’s strange but henceforth ... less singular relationship with materiality and embodiment”
(2002). Cayley clearly differentiates code from language at a fundamental level, but at the same
time reminds us that the latter’s bio-physical associations with human communication are not
distinct. Humans code as a way of communicating person to person and within wider cultural
contexts. We instruct each other, determine and assess actions through orders, laws, and even
principles. Fundamentally, the cybernetic evolution of programming languages represents the
ongoing refinement of textual logic as a symbolic apparatus. At the same time, textual logic,
regardless of its sophistication, seems innately inadequate serving as the primary parameters for
human cognition, never mind agency.
Modern communication and information studies from Weiner to the present-day support
similar parallels between coding and linguistic systems. At the same time, current theories of

computation as a model of language use can seem almost purposefully open-ended and
ambiguous in terms of their approach. Schools in formal linguistics, for example, typically view
language’s role in cognition to be distinct from all other cognitive behaviors, operating according
to its own structuring principles. However, cybernetics with its introduction of various advanced
linguistic apparatuses continues to provide key insights into language’s possible reconfiguration
as a mode of computation. Contemporary neuroscience research into Natural Language
Processing (NLP) and AI, in fact, remains comparably divided into theories that model
intelligence according to the statistical, algorithmic configuration of language use across
different media formats and those approaches that seek to match computational linguistics more
literally with activity in the human brain. This latter perspective, commonly described as the “top
down” model, seems especially eager to determine how computers might best mimic organic,
human thinking. The “bottom up” model, by contrast, holds that the key to better computational
systems depends upon the constant refinement of their internal logic programs with little direct
interest in replicating human biology. Both models of computation yield algorithms that
successfully augment, if not surpass, human information processing, especially when limited to
specific fields of study. Yet, their respective core concepts of learning and even cognition, itself,
differ substantially. Where the top down model aims to develop something akin to an artificial
human brain, casting aside its organic mysteries while enhancing its capacities, the bottom up
method argues that computation can enrich brain activity without necessarily becoming one.
Here, parallel to Turing’s views, trial and error calculations set against any number of random
cause and effect sequences at superhuman speeds, pivoting either marginally closer to or further
away from targeted outcomes, will achieve aims just as effectively as pre-formulated procedures.
In fact, regardless of data field, trial and error computation remains at the moment more

productive than most alternative, top-down approaches once levels of programming begin to
reach a certain degree of complexity. More precise methods for coding physiological networks
continue to yield impressive developments in artificial neural networks (ANNs); at the same
time, trial and error methods in AI (with their origin in the logical engineering of efficient
systems) still surpass any system trying to strictly model and thus replicate the many
complexities of biological processes.
Language, understood bio-physically, perhaps even as unique to the brain, presents a
persistent set of programming challenges, often leading to especially intricate models of digital
computation. Even a brief overview of the complex relationship between digital computation and
other linguistic operations tends to emphasize how human language use rarely conforms to
textual formats, especially those featuring more rigid, algorithmically informed grammars.
Computation as a practice, in fact, starkly outlines this very dichotomy by highlighting the
technical limits of algorithms and programs as information tools regardless of their structural
sophistication. At the same time, all bio-physical language activity appears in consistent need of
algorithmic, textual augmentation, whether it simply be through improved lexicons and rulebased grammars, or lightning fast NLP tools employed broadly via ANNs across the entire
internet. Digital writing technologies continue to be developed, in this way, as a specific means
to address, if not solve, the inherent difficulties of aligning language as a bio-physical process
with any mode of programming.
Perhaps nowhere does this challenge seem better exemplified than in IBM’s recent
experiment with AI and rhetorical argument the company brands “Project Debater.” IBM
declares Project Debater to be the first “AI system that can debate humans on complex topics,”
autonomously developing and delivering its own speeches on prescribed issues with the added

capacity to “rebut” any counter claims or propositions for an extended parley ("AI Learns the Art
of Debate," 2020). The arrival of Project Debater in effect asks us to consider the very art of
argument, long presumed key evidence of reasoned cognition and free will, simply another
function of information technology. Just as significant, of course, is the corresponding need to
address newly apparent human cognitive deficits in such processes. Project Debater is designed
to augment argumentation by pushing it beyond current human limitations. Cybernetic
argumentation functions, in other words, as a way forward to improve analysis and decisionmaking, much as Christopher Strachey’s original experiments with M.U.C. implied significant
social and cognitive interest in enhancing written correspondence through the technologies and
logic of mass production. Both projects can be considered failures in the sense that the end
results proved to be inferior to human efforts with language. M.U.C.’s letters proved to be less
than convincing. The great debate was won by a human. At the same time, each technology
provided useful technical advances for different linguistic practices. Strachey’s template may
have been primitive, but the lexicons it drew from, if prepared and collected properly, suggest
that such resources can easily be rendered to surpass conventional human capacities. Countless
different adjectives, nouns, adverbs, and verbs, then as now, can randomly be placed in the
following fashion:
“you are my [adjective] [noun]. my [adjective] [noun] [adverb]
[verbs] your [adjective] [noun].” (Roberts, 2017)
Similarly, Project Debater appears in any argument process to have access to countless examples
and contexts it can instantaneously bring to the table. We see here how each project advances
information production for the first time on the level of content. Bio-physical language
processing can be critically substantiated with functional prototypes or models for information

production regardless of field, format, or even genre. Hence, Strachey’s templates, in terms of
linguistic aims, compares well to the impressive power of today’s artificial neural networks. The
technical devices may have changed, but their approach to language use remains highly
consistent. Since the late 1990s, machine learning language models continue to be in rapid
development and are now running applications and services for some of the largest tech
industries in the world, including Google (TensorFlow), Facebook (PyTorch) and SalesForce
(AWSD). These advanced networks can be understood much as any grammar in that they
generate text by determining a rule-based probability for how different linguistic units should
sequence each other in a given body of work. Units can be words or even sentences depending
how the text is meant to be read. Each of these models features what’s known in neural
programming as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) architecture, where the timing and
frequency of human language use across the internet are continuously calibrated to improve the
tool’s predictive capability.
Some of the more sophisticated literary experiments using these very same devices can
be seen in the work of David “Jhave” Johnson, who regularly combines neural network
programming with his own linguistic responses he defines as “Big-Data Poetry.” His “ReRites”
project, conceived formally in 2011, for example, enabled him to produce 12 volumes of poetry
in just 12 months. The set edition was published by Anteism Books in 2019. Each volume made
use of the OpenAI GPT-2 algorithm as developed by the San Francisco non-profit research group
OpenAI for generating complete paragraphs of coherent text. The GPT-2, the second model in
OpenAI’s experiments with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) programming, operates
similarly compared to other LSTM architectures. Jhave provides an even broader comparison
between language models like GPT-2 and all prior attempts within modern culture to

conceptualize linguistic practices from a technological, information-driven perspective. On one
level, reading, itself, as a cognitive modality, can be understood according to the terms of an
LSTM architecture.
In the eras of the printing press, poets (writers and intellectuals) aspired to be well-read.
Some aspired to breadth, others to depth, yet all recognized the cognitive benefits of
reading: through the osmosis of many words, patterns and process and modes of
communication became clear. Now the amount written exceeds the capacity to read, a
brain beyond the brain is needed to analyze and interpret the results. Big data can digest
the literary torrent. (“FQA: Frequently Questioned Answers,” BDP: Big-Data Poetry)
Jhave’s comparison of the activity of reading to modes of cognitive osmosis easily recalls
Strachey’s earlier project, save with better, more responsive tools. Cognitive augmentation
through LSTM language models is constantly evolving, enabling artificial neural networks to
predict with better accuracy both the context and content of any text being processed. At the
same time, as “Big-Data Poetry” makes clear, language’s increasingly complex relationship to
the technical devices of algorithmic programming yields an astonishing assortment of new
literary resources, while enhancing the creative capacity of poetics to pry into the role linguistic
structure and pattern generally play in determining verbal meaning. Jhave considers his project to
provide a critical site of “poetic intervention to demonstrate a cultural, altruistic, playful use of
A.I.” (“FQA: Frequently Questioned Answers,” BDP: Big-Data Poetry).
Jhave’s call for an “intervention” implies a need for active involvement, possibly dissent.
AI presents a formidable challenge to how we use language, whether as speech or script;
certainly, the antagonism permeating experiments like Project Debate is meant, in part, to
threaten human cognitive primacy. Yet the altruism Jhave also conveys may infer a more
complex tactic of mediation or mitigation. To play or toy with AI, even when directed by poesis,
requires a conceptual framework that simultaneously recognizes language’s dual function as both
a programming device and a core component of human social interaction. Such a framework

must support the cultural value of linguistic programming, especially as demonstrated in neural
networks, while maintaining a critical interest in language’s bio-physical, social origins. It might
be tempting at this point to arrange this dualism into a more traditional dialectical relationship,
pitting human language use as a necessary and evolving antithesis to neural processing. Beyond
dialectics, artists and theorists alike continue to struggle to re-imagine the very terms of literacy
itself in the digital era.
Important insights into this question also appear in Gilbert Simondon’s philosophical
consideration of transduction in natural systems, as first laid out in his 1958 thesis On the Mode
of Existence in Technical Objects (2017). At base, transduction provides a possible system for
differentiating symbolic, algorithm-based linguistic functions from language embodied as a
material, bio-physical event, while emphasizing their interdependence. Simondon uses the term
to describe the relationship between technical prototypes developed through research and their
concrete realization as material events and processes. The procedure derives from
thermodynamics to explain the conversion of potential energy into some kinetic form in the
physical world, such as we see when an electric circuit discharges stored energy into a light bulb
to produce visible light. While the electric circuit connected to the light supplies a source of
ready electric current as potential energy, very little of it (only 5%) actually converts to light
with the rest transforming into heat. Transduction accounts for the dual dispersal, where one
kinetic event, the light, is expected and thus prioritized over the other, the heat. Eventually the
secondary, regressive mode of dispersal overcomes the prioritized one, and the bulb will burn
out. Any device within the circuit used to resist this process can be called a transducer, mediating
between the preferred outcome and the regressive one. In the case of electric circuits, these
devices would include various sustainers, filaments, etc. Simondon uses examples of circuit

diagrams in his own original study to illustrate the process of transduction as key feature in all
technical systems, where potential forms of energy inevitably disperse into specified concrete
events, one set being determinable, and a secondary one radical, often unaccountable.
This relationship between potential and kinetic or dispersed forms of energy emerges in
Simondon’s work as a useful epistemological model, outlining an interdependent dualism in
nature between the determinable and multitudinous. Evidence of this dualism occurs throughout
Jhave’s poetic interventions in A.I., where he actively – i.e., kinetically – engages linguistic
prototypes to bring into being, not just a determinable, expected set of readings, but a host of
other radical possibilities. In fact, to work with “Big-Data Poetry” is to witness an ongoing
struggle in language between any preferred semantic expectations and a seemingly torrential
wave of multiple regressive outcomes. Writers, accordingly, take on the role of transducers in
order to mitigate and possibly prolong the prototype’s linguistic usefulness. The composer and
music theorist Paulo de Assis emphasizes similar processes in Simondon’s theory to help explain
its general significance in epistemology; a defining feature remains temporality. Transduction, he
notes, “happens in time, it is a process, an operation with a temporal and energetic direction
(even if not precisely determinable). And this temporal dimension unfolds from one point to the
next, in closest vicinity from one another, but not in a full continuum” (700). AI effectively
provides prototypes that help codify and therefore simplify real-time language use. At the same
time, they appear to sponsor a natural degradation in form and format through ongoing
individuated, concrete occurrences in time. While A.I. modeling helps us understand language
use as information, using grammatical prototypes to invoke states of potential meaning, semantic
processes remain the direct result of bio-physical (organic and inorganic), individuated linguistic
dispersal.

Natural Language Processing seems to follow closely specific principles of transductive
behavior, where information is concretely dispersed in time, expressing remnants of its modeling
to varying degrees of determinability. One might even further qualify the temporal flow of this
process as a kind of semantic discharge, encapsulated on one level as a programmable execution,
and on another, once again, as bio-physical ambiguity. Here, language acquires a possible
structure that encompasses computation as easily as human interaction; for both environments
invoke states of potential meaning within an arranged, grammatical model, a programmability
independent of its execution, as well as numerous concrete states realized upon said execution,
some expected, others regressive. In Simondon’s words, such prototypes provided a kind of
“resistance module,” allowing us to differentiate objects concurrently as integral, homogenous
forms as well as individual, one-of-a-kind experiences or events.
Simondon intended his study of transduction to cover a wide variety of different
modalities and contexts, extending beyond electro-magnetism to include the arts, economics, and
the biosciences. In an early collection of essays taken from his 1958 thesis, published in France
in 2005 as L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, we see
transduction presented more broadly as a theory of form, designed to counter more traditional
approaches, such as Gestalt Theory, by including explicit references to energy as a vital
component. Whether in its potential or concrete state, form, Simondon argues, invokes specific
energetic conditions as part of its very constitution (2005). When information is carried in any
system, regardless of context, we see the real-time transformation of a pre-assembled
constitution of forces, intensities and energies into countless new signals, each of them expressed
in a single instant of time.

The application of energetic conditions to linguistic systems reveals a similarly intense
interdependence between language as programmability and language as execution. Though
fraught with conflict, degradation, and constant reconfiguration, the ongoing creation of
multifarious linked states within just about any technical structure helped Simondon
conceptualize the concrete world around us as naturally heterogeneous, and therefore never
reliably derived from uniform, law-based appropriations. Transduction shows instead a sense of
experiential reality where the models informing our worldviews appear ever locked in a
continuous, interactive flow between arrangement and dispersal. This cycle can be further
qualified as negentropic, as various states and objects simultaneously degrade and re-stabilize
into new structures only to repeat the process again. The recurrent nature of any such sequence
bears out, for Simondon, what he terms an especial “metastability,” the nature of which can be
traced to three factors originating, once again, in thermodynamics: 1. the potential energy of a
system; 2. that same system’s formal magnitude (“ordres de grandeur”); and 3. its ongoing
entropy, or energetic degradation (2017). Linguistic processes, especially when considered in the
context of computation, seem well served by Simondon’s theories, especially when we conceive
the computer at a basic level as an assembled state of potential computational executions ready
for dispersal. Even if some linguistic systems like code appear to rely more heavily on fixed
grammars, holding their potential meanings more regularly than other language practices like
community-driven slang use, linguistic sense in general seems to follow transductive shifts in
meaning between experiential communication and its grammatical modeling.
Transduction, with its metastable systems, gives us a unique paradigm for language
practices after the dawn of programming. Computation, as innovators like Strachey and more
recently David “Jhave” Johnson have shown in their respective experiments this past half-

century, has significantly transformed how we perceive and engage language at both an
ontological as well as epistemological level. Procedures for writing and reading, reimagined as
digital, computational modalities, might usefully take into consideration Simondon’s theory of
metastable, transductive behaviors to provide better insights into these new, more complex
linguistic systems.
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